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This paper examines the economic impact of international remittances on countries and 
households in the developing world.  To analyze the country-level impact of remittances, 
the paper estimates an econometric model based on a new data set of 115 developing 
countries.  Results suggest that countries located close to a major remittance-sending 
region (like the United States, OECD-Europe) are more likely to receive international 
remittances, and that while the level of poverty in a country has no statistical effect on the 
amount of remittances received, for those countries which are fortunate enough to receive 
remittances these resource flows do tend to reduce the level and depth of poverty.  At the 
household level, a review of findings from recent research suggests that households 
receiving international remittances spend less at the margin on consumption goods – like 
food – and more on investment goods – like education and housing.   Households 
receiving international remittances also tend to invest more in entrepreneurial activities. 
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International migration is one of the most important factors affecting economic 
relations between developed and developing countries in the 21
st Century.  At the start of 
the century it was estimated that about 175 million people – roughly 3 percent of the 
world population – lived and worked outside the country of their birth (United Nations, 
2002).  The international remittances sent by these migrant workers to their households 
back home have a large and profound impact on the developing world.  According to 
Global Development Finance (World Bank, 2004), official international remittances sent 
home by migrant workers represent the second most important source of external funding 
in developing countries.
1  Official international remittances now total $75 billion per year 
and are about twice as large as the level of official aid-related inflows to developing 
countries.
2 
  Despite the ever-increasing size of official international remittances, relatively 
little attention has been paid to examining the economic impact of these transfers on 
households in developing countries.   A host of key policy questions thus remain 
unanswered:  What kind of migrants remit, and how much is remitted to various regions 
of the developing world?  How do international remittances affect the welfare and 
poverty status of households in various countries?  And how do remittance-receiving 
households consume and invest their remittance earnings?   
  This paper proposes to answer these, and similar, questions using a three-step 
approach.  First, the paper builds a new data set of 115 developing countries. This data 
set includes all those developing countries which were reported by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) as having received official international remittances in the year 
2003.  The paper uses this data set to identify the regional distribution of remittance flows 
in the developing world, and to analyze the economic determinants of remittance flows.  
Second, the paper reviews findings from recent household-level research on how 
remittances affect welfare and poverty in various developing countries.
3  This section 
finds that the receipt of international remittances increases the level of household income 
and reduces the level and depth of poverty in the developing world.  Third, the paper 
reviews findings from recent research on how remittance-receiving households consume 
and invest their remittance earnings.  This section shows that households receiving 
international remittances spend less at the margin on consumption goods – like food –   2
and more on investment items -- like education and housing.  Households receiving 
remittances also have a higher likelihood of investing in entrepreneurial activities.  
  This paper proceeds in five sections.  Section 1 defines official international 
remittances and presents the new data set of 115 developing countries.  Section 2 uses 
this macro-level data set to estimate an econometric model to identity the determinants of 
remittances within the developing world.  Moving to the level of the household, Section 3 
examines how the receipt of international remittances affects the welfare and poverty 
status of households in various developing countries.  Section 4 then analyzes how 
households consume and invest their remittance earnings, and the impact of these 
remittance expenditures on entrepreneurial activities and economic development.  Section 
5 summarizes the findings and highlights areas for future work.  
 
1.  Official International Remittances; Data Set of 115 Developing Countries 
It should be stressed at the outset that a variety of data problems make it difficult 
to accurately examine the impact of international remittances on the developing world.  
These data problems relate to the way in which information on international remittances 
is collected and compiled.  While the International Monetary Fund (IMF) publishes 
annual records of the amount of “worker remittances” received by developing countries 
in its Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, these IMF data rely entirely on the 
reporting conventions of the central banks of some 185 developing countries.  In other 
words, while the central banks of many developing countries may receive remittances 
from their citizens working abroad, and correctly record these income flows as “worker 
remittances,” the central banks in other countries may report such remittance flows under 
another line item in the balance of payments.  In short, there is no reliable and consistent 
rule for enforcing the way that developing countries report “worker remittances” in their 
balance of payments.  This means that some countries which produce large numbers of 
international migrants – like the Philippines and the Russian Federation – report receiving 
little or no “worker remittances” because they (probably) record these remittance flows 
under another category in their balance of payments.
4  This “mis-categorization” of 
remittances results in an underestimate of the actual flow of remittance monies returning 
to certain developing countries.   3
Another, equally important, data problem is that IMF information on the level of 
“worker remittances” includes only data on official worker remittance flows, that is, 
remittance monies which are transmitted through official banking channels.  Since a large 
(and unknown) proportion of worker remittance monies is transmitted through private 
and  unrecorded channels, the level of remittances recorded by the IMF underestimates 
the actual flow of remittances – official and unofficial -- returning to many developing 
countries.  
In view of these problems, this paper constructs a new data set that includes 
information on official international remittances for 115 developing countries.  These 
countries were selected because they were listed in the latest (2004) edition of the IMF, 
Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook.   In this data set official international 
remittances are defined as “worker remittances.”  The 2004 edition of the IMF Yearbook 
lists data on official international remittances for 76 of these 115 developing countries 
(66 percent).  The 39 developing countries with no remittance data in this edition of the 
IMF Yearbook either did not receive worker remittances in 2003 or they did not report 
such transfers as “worker remittances.”    
Table 1 shows the regional distribution of official international remittances for 
these 115 developing countries over the 5-year period, 1998 to 2003.   The data show that 
two regions of the developing world – Latin America and the Caribbean, and South Asia 
– receive the lion’s share of international remittances.  In 2003 these two regions 
received, respectively, 42.3 percent and 23.9 percent of all official international 
remittances.
5  By contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa received less than 5 percent of all official 
international remittances in 2003. 
Table 1 reveals that for the developing world as a whole, official international 
remittances have been increasing at about 8 percent per year.   However, in two regions 
of the world – Europe and Central Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa – the level of official 
international remittances actually fell over the last five years. 
Table 2 presents another view of the data by showing the distribution of official 
international remittances by income group of country:  low income, lower middle income 
or upper middle income.  In both 1998 and 2003 lower middle income countries – that is, 
countries with annual GDP per capita between $736 and $2,935 – received the largest   4
share of remittances.  This group of lower middle income countries, which includes many 
countries from the Latin America and Caribbean region, also recorded the largest 
percentage increase in remittances between 1998 and 2003.  By contrast, the group of low 
income countries, which includes mainly countries from Sub-Saharan Africa,
6 recorded 
the smallest increase in official international remittances over the time period.   
 
2.  Economic Determinants of Official International Remittances 
  It is possible to take the data set of 115 developing countries, add various 
variables, and then estimate an economic model of the determinants of international 
remittances.  This seems useful in order to address several of the key policy questions 
concerning the economic determinants of international remittances.  For example, what is 
the relationship between poverty, income inequality and remittances?  Do the poorest 
countries of the world tend to produce more international migrants and receive more 
international remittances than other countries?   
  The determinants of official international remittances can be analyzed by using 
the type of gravity model suggested by Greenwood (1975) and Borjas (1987, 1989) for 
examining international migration.  In general terms, such a model can be expressed as: 
 R ij = α0 + α1yi +  α2cij + εij   (I = 1, . . , N; j = 1, . .,N)      (1) 
where Rij is the flow of per capita international remittances between developing country i 
and remittance-sending region j,  yi is the per capita income of remittance-receiving 
country i, cij is the cost of migrating from country i to region j, and ε is an error term.     
  Unfortunately, equation (1) cannot be estimated because our data set contains no 
information on the costs of migration (cij).  Since this problem is also common to other 
empirical studies, a typical solution is to use the shortest air distance between remittance-
receiving and remittance-sending countries as a proxy variable.
7   This is the solution that 
will be adopted here:  the costs of migration will be measured by the air distance from the 
developing country to one of three major remittance-sending regions (United States, 
OECD (Europe) or the Arab Gulf). 
  In addition to the two explanatory variables listed in equation (1) – per capita 
income and migration costs – it seems likely that other economic, demographic and 
financial variables may also influence the receipt of international remittances.  From an   5
economic standpoint, it is useful to enter both a per capita income variable and its square 
in the equation to see if the propensity to receive remittances rises and then declines with 
level of country income.  In other words, developing countries with very low levels of 
income may be unable to produce many international migrants and so receive 
international remittances, while developing countries with very high levels of income 
may lack the incentive to produce migrants and receive remittances.  It also seems 
possible that the level of income inequality may affect the receipt of international 
remittances.  The reasoning here is that countries with higher levels of income inequality 
may produce more migrants and receive more official international remittances.  
Similarly, the level of poverty in a country may affect the receipt of international 
remittances.  Controlling for level of income and income inequality, countries with higher 
rates of poverty may have more people who are willing to go work abroad and remit 
money back home.
8   With respect to demographic variables, human capital theory 
generally argues that more educated people are more likely to migrate (Becker, 1993; 
Harris and Todaro, 1970).  It is therefore likely that countries that more educated people 
might also receive more remittances.  For this reason, a variable measuring the share of a 
country’s population that has completed secondary education can be entered into the 
equation.  Finally, financial variables – such as a country’s credit worthiness – may also 
have an effect on remittances.
9  The reasoning here is that migrants might be more likely 
to remit to countries that have good economic management, as measured by a high 
international credit rating.          
  Combining all of these variables together, the empirical version of the model to be 
estimated can be written as: 
 Log  Rij = λ0 + λ1log(dij) +  λ2log(yi) + λ3log(yi)
2 + λ4log(gi) 
  +   λ5log(povi) +  λ6log(edi) + λ7log(popi) + λ8log(crdi) 




ijREG β  + εij                                                   (2) 
where dij  is the distance between developing country i and remittance-sending region j,  
and for each developing country i, y is income (measured by per capita GDP), g is the 
level of income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient), pov is the level of poverty 
(measured by the poverty headcount index
10 set at the international standard of   6
$1.00/person/day), ed is the share of the population over age 25 that has completed 
secondary school, pop is population density (people per square mile), crd is country 
credit rating and REG is a set of 5 dummy variables for various regions of the developing 
world.  The regional dummy variables (East Asia omitted) control for fixed effects by 
geographic area of the world. 
  Equation (2) can be estimated in two different ways:  (1) the dependent variable 
can be measured using per capita remittance data from 2003; and (2) the dependent 
variable can be measured using pooled data, that is, per capita remittance data from both 
years, 1998 and 2003.  Since the first method of estimating equation (2) has only a 
limited number of observations (n is between 44 and 55), the second method is useful for 
checking the robustness of results.   
  The results of equation (2) are shown in Table 3.  Columns (1) to (3) of the table 
show results using the 2003 remittance data for different combinations of economic 
variables, and columns (4) to (6) show results using the pooled remittance data for both 
1998 and 2003.  Since all of the variables are expressed in log terms, the results can be 
interpreted as elasticities.  
  Four results in Table 3 are noteworthy.  The first result concerns the distance 
variable.  In all versions except one of the model the coefficient for distance is negatively 
and significantly related to the receipt of per capita official international remittances.  On 
average, a 10 percent increase in distance to a remittance-sending region will reduce the 
level of per capita international remittances received by a developing country by between 
6.4 and 6.8 percent.    
  This result, which parallels those of other studies concerning the relationship 
between distance and international migration,
11seems to accord with reality.  Developing 
countries which are located close to major remittance-sending regions – like Latin 
American countries located close to the United States, or South Asian countries located 
close to the Arab Gulf -- are also those countries which receive the largest amount of 
official international remittances.  All other things being constant, countries which are 
located close to major remittance-sending regions receive more remittances because the 
costs of migration for their citizens are lower.   7
  The second result in Table 3 concerns the per capita GDP income variable (and its 
square).  These two variables are positive and negative, respectively, and highly 
significant across all versions of the model.  This suggests that an inverted U-shaped 
curve exists between the level of country income (development) and the receipt of per 
capita official international remittances.  In other words, developing countries with low or 
high per capita GDP incomes receive smaller levels of per capita international 
remittances than do middle-income developing countries.   
Figure 1 uses the data from column (6) in Table 3 to graph the relationship 
between the receipt of per capita official international remittances and per capita GDP 
income.  According to the figure, the level of per capita remittances received by a country 
increases until a country has a per capita GDP income (in 1995 prices) of $2,100, and 
falls thereafter.  This means that countries in the upper ranges of the lower-middle 
income bracket – with annual per capita GDP between $736 and $2,935 -- receive the 
most in per capita official international remittances.  It appears that people from lower-
middle income countries possess both the incentive to go work abroad and the ability to 
afford the travel costs associated with international migration.  By contrast, people from 
low income countries – like Sub-Saharan Africa – lack the financial means to become 
international migrants and people from higher-income countries lack the incentive to go 
work abroad.  
The third result in Table 3 concerns the human capital variable:  share of country 
population with secondary school education.  Rather than being positive and significant, 
as predicted by human capital theory, this variable is negative and usually statistically 
insignificant.  This outcome suggests that the share of secondary-school educated people 
in a country’s population has no particular effect on the level of per capita remittances 
received by that country.   More empirical work is needed to identify the reasons why this 
is true.        
The final result in Table 3 concerns the poverty variable:  poverty headcount 
measured at $1.00/person/day.  This variable is never statistically significant in any 
version of the model.  This means that the level of poverty in a developing country has no 
particular effect on the amount of per capita international remittances received by that 
country.  One possible interpretation of this finding is that international migrants do not   8
remit for altruistic purposes in order to help their poor relations at home.  Another (more 
likely) interpretation is that countries with high levels of poverty – like those in Sub-
Saharan Africa -- are not producing many international migrants (and thereby receiving 
international remittances) in the first place.  More empirical work is needed to determine 
which of these interpretations is correct. 
 
 
3.  International Remittances, Welfare and Poverty 
  Now that the economic determinants of international remittances have been 
identified at the macro-level in the developing world, it becomes important to identify the 
impact of these resource flows on welfare and poverty in specific developing countries.  
Household surveys represent the best source of information for doing this, because these 
surveys collect disaggregated data on the level of income received by households with 
and without remittances.   
  It should, however, be noted that any effort to use household data to examine the 
impact of international remittances on welfare and poverty involves several important 
methodological issues.  On the one hand, it is possible to treat international remittances as 
a simple exogenous transfer of income by migrants.  When treated as an exogenous 
transfer, the economic question becomes:  How do international remittances, in total or at 
the margin, affect the observed level of welfare and poverty in a specific developing 
country?  On the other hand, it is also possible to treat international remittances as a 
potential substitute for domestic (home) earnings.  When treated as a potential substitute 
for home earnings, the economic question becomes:  How does the observed level of 
welfare and poverty in a country compare to a counterfactual scenario without migration 
and remittances but including an imputation for the home earnings of migrants had those 
people stayed and worked at home?  This latter treatment uses econometric techniques to 
compare the level of welfare and poverty in a country with and without international 
remittances.   
  The rest of this section will draw upon recent papers to illustrate each of these 
methodological approaches.  The first three papers treat international remittances as a 
simple exogenous transfer of income, and simulate changes in the level of poverty based   9
upon either the total withdrawal of remittances or a marginal increase in remittance 
income.  The fourth paper compares the observed level of welfare and poverty with a 
counterfactual scenario without remittances, that includes an imputation for the home 
earnings of international migrants.  The fifth, and final, paper in this section focuses more 
on international migration than remittances and adopts a different methodological 
approach to examine how international migration affects child health outcomes.  All of 
these papers show that international migration and remittances have important effects on 
welfare and poverty. 
  The first paper, and probably the broadest in scope, uses results from household 
surveys in 71 developing countries to analyze the impact of international migration and 
remittances on poverty in the developing world (Adams and Page, 2005).  Since 
international migration and remittances may be endogenous to poverty outcomes, the 
paper uses various instruments – including distance between remittance-sending and 
receiving countries – to correct for this problem.  Using these instruments, and 
controlling for the level of income, income inequality and geographic region, the paper 
finds that a 10 percent increase in per capita official international remittances in a 
developing country will lead to a 3.5 percent decline in the share of people living on less 
than $1.00/person/day in that country.  Other estimates suggest that a similar 10 percent 
increase in per capita remittances will reduce the depth of poverty in a country by 3.9 
percent.  Since both of these results are similar to those produced by non-instrumented 
estimates, the paper concludes that international remittances reduce both the level and 
depth of poverty in the developing world.   
  The second paper uses data from a 1986/87 survey of 7680 households in rural 
and urban Lesotho to examine how the cessation of international remittances would affect 
welfare and poverty in that country (Gustafsson and Makonnen, 1993).  Lesotho sends 
large numbers of migrant workers to work in the mines in South Africa.  As a result, 
international remittances represent the main source of income for 35 percent of  Lesotho 
households.  Since it is possible that South African employers might stop hiring Lesotho 
workers, the paper simulates the effects on household welfare and poverty if international 
remittances would stop altogether.  If remittances were set to zero, the paper finds that 
average per capita household consumption would fall by 32 percent.  Moreover, if   10
remittances were set to zero, the poverty headcount index in Lesotho would increase by 
26 percent.  In addition, a cessation of remittances would lead to a 52 percent increase in 
the poverty gap index.  The poverty gap index is a more sensitive measure of poverty 
because it considers the depth of poverty, that is, the amount by which the average 
income of the poor falls short of the poverty line.  In other words, a cessation of 
international remittances would lead to a larger increase in the depth of poverty as 
opposed to the level of poverty in Lesotho. 
The third paper uses data from a 2003 survey of 1782 households in rural Mexico 
to examine the marginal impact of international remittances on welfare and poverty in 
that country (Taylor, Mora and Adams, 2005).  As in Lesotho, international remittances 
account for a sizeable proportion of total per capita household income in rural Mexico:  
15 percent.  Most of these international remittances come from migrants working in the 
United States.  To analyze the impact of these remittance flows on poverty, the paper 
develops a national poverty line, which includes the cost of basic food and nonfood items 
in rural Mexico.
12  According to this poverty line, about 58 percent of all rural Mexican 
households have per capita incomes below the poverty line.  To demonstrate the impact 
of international remittances on poverty, the paper estimates the rural poverty effects of a 
10 percent increase in international remittances.  The paper finds that such an increase in 
international remittances would reduce the poverty headcount and the poverty gap indices 
by 0.77 and 0.53, respectively.  In other words, in rural Mexico international remittances 
reduce both the level and depth of poverty. 
The fourth paper uses data from a 2000 survey of 7276 households in urban and 
rural Guatemala to compare the observed level of welfare and poverty in that country 
with a counterfactual scenario without remittances (Adams, 2005a).  To establish the 
counterfactual, the study uses predicted income functions to estimate per capita 
household incomes in two situations:  excluding remittances (but including an imputation 
for the home earnings of international migrants had they stayed home); and including 
remittances.
13  The results show that in the including remittances situation, the mean level 
of international remittance-receiving households is about 40 percent higher than for 
households not receiving remittances.  In other words, the receipt of international 
remittances greatly increases the level of per capita household incomes in Guatemala.   11
With respect to poverty, the paper finds that the receipt of international remittances 
reduces the poverty headcount index by 1.6 percent and the more sensitive poverty gap 
index by 12.6 percent.  This means that international remittances have a greater impact on 
reducing the depth as opposed to the level of poverty in Guatemala.    
Table 4 from the Guatemala paper shows why international remittances reduce 
the depth of poverty more than the level of poverty.  This table ranks all 7276 households 
in the Guatemala data set into decile groups on the basis of per capita expenditure 
(excluding remittances).  Column (2) of this table shows that households in the lowest 
decile group receive a huge share – over 60 percent -- of their total household income 
from international remittances.   When households in this bottom decile group – the 
“poorest of the poor” -- receive international remittances their income status changes 
dramatically.  This in turn has a large effect on any poverty measure – like the poverty 
gap – which considers both the number and the distance of poor households beneath the 
poverty line.  By contrast, Table 4 shows that households near the poverty line (roughly 
the fifth decile group) do not receive a very large proportion of their household income 
from remittances.  As a result, the poverty headcount measure does not decline much in 
Guatemala with the inclusion of international remittances in household income.  
The fifth paper focuses more on international migration than remittances, and 
adopts a different methodological approach to examine the impact of international 
migration on child health outcomes in rural Mexico (Hildebrandt and McKenzie, 2004).  
Based on a nationally-representative 1997 demographic survey of 16,500 children in 
12,400 households in rural Mexico, the paper compares differences in infant mortality, 
birth weight and health inputs between international migrant and non-migrant 
households.  About 19 percent of the survey households have an international migrant.  
Since international migration may be endogenous to health outcomes, the paper uses 
instruments – focused on historic Mexico-to-US migration patterns – to control for this 
problem.  Using these instruments, and controlling for various factors, the paper finds 
that children born in international migrant households are 3 percent less likely to die in 
their first year than children in non-migrant households.  Children born in an international 
migrant household are also estimated to weigh 360 grams – 0.64 of a standard deviation – 
more than children in non-migrant households.  The paper suggests that these positive   12
health outcomes are caused by increased income and wealth, that is, international 
remittances raise the health status of rural Mexican households by providing these 
households with more money to invest in child health.   
 
4.  International Remittances, Consumption, Investment and Development 
  In examining the impact of international remittances on development, the basic 
question is simple:  How are remittance monies spent or used?  Do households receiving 
remittances channel these earnings into human and physical capital investments, or do 
they merely use these monies to purchase new “status-oriented” consumer goods? 
  In the past, researchers have often taken a rather pessimistic view of how 
remittances are spent or used and the impact of these monies on development.  For 
example, a recent review of the literature by Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah (2003:10-11) 
reported three stylized facts:  first, that a “significant proportion, and often the majority,” 
of remittances are spent on consumption; second, that a smaller part of remittance funds 
goes into saving or investment; and third, the ways in which remittances are typically 
saved or invested  – in housing, land and jewelry – are “not necessarily productive” to the 
economy as a whole.    
  Several interrelated factors seem to be responsible for this dim view of the impact 
of remittances on economic development.  On a most basic level, since decisions on how 
to spend remittances are made by thousands (if not millions) of individual households, it 
is difficult to establish exactly how these monies are used.  Much of the literature in this 
area thus tends to be anecdotal, rather than empirical.  At the same time, household 
budget surveys, which represent the best possible source of information about how 
remittances are spent, are often poorly designed.  Oftentimes, these household surveys 
ask “naïve” questions about remittance earnings were spent or used.  Since remittances 
are fungible like any other source of income, simply asking respondents about how 
remittances were spent is not enough.  Remittances that are not being spent directly on 
investment may well have freed other resources for expenditures on investment.  Third, 
the small handful of empirically-based studies that do exist on remittances and economic 
development are often based on small, unrepresentative household samples.  For instance, 
the Adams (1998) study of how international remittances are used in rural Pakistan is   13
based on only 500 households.
14  Clearly, there is a need to extend the scope of these 
studies to examine the impact of remittances on economic development by using larger, 
nationally representative samples. 
  The rest of this section will examine how remittances are spent or used at the 
household level by drawing upon the results of five recent papers.  Each of these papers 
is based on a large, (usually) nationally-representative sample from a different developing 
country, and each study finds that international remittances has a positive effect on some 
aspect of development. 
  The first, and probably most ambitious, paper uses four linked household surveys 
from the Philippines to analyze how exchange rate shocks during the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis affected the expenditure patterns of 1646 Philippine households receiving 
international remittances (Yang, 2004).   Since the paper has panel data from before and 
after the 1997 crisis, it is able to analyze how different types of exchange rate shocks – 
positive and negative -- affected changes in the expenditure patterns of remittance-
receiving households.  This represents a type of “natural experiment,” because the size 
and direction of exchange rate shocks are probably uncorrelated with other household-
level shocks.  As shown in Table 5, the study finds that positive exchange rate shocks had 
no statistical effect on the level of expenditures by remittance-receiving households on 
food.  In other words, households receiving more remittance income as a result of 
favorable exchange rate shocks are not “wasting” such income on increased food 
consumption.  Rather, Table 5 shows that positive exchange rate shocks led to a 
statistically significant rise in remittance-household expenditures on education, and a 
reduction in total hours worked by male children.  For example, a one-standard deviation 
increase in the size of the exchange rate shock led to a 0.4 percent increase in remittance-
household expenditures on education in the Philippines.  The paper also finds that 
favorable exchange rate shocks were associated with increased investment by remittance-
receiving households in entrepreneurial activities, specifically transportation, 
communication and manufacturing enterprises.  In all likelihood, households receiving 
more remittances as a result of positive exchange rate shocks were able to invest more in 
these relatively capital-intensive enterprises because they no longer faced the credit 
constraints that had previously hindered such investments.     14
  The second paper expands upon the theme of remittances and investment in 
entrepreneurial activities by using a 1988 survey of 1526 Egyptians migrants who had 
worked abroad and then returned home (McCormick and Wahba, 2001).   Since the 
survey includes data on the pre- and post-migration employment histories of migrants, 
the paper is able to examine how international migration and remittances affect the 
probability that a migrant will become an entrepreneur -- employer, self-employed person 
or business owner – upon return from working abroad.
15  The paper finds that two factors 
– time spent working abroad and total amount of money saved abroad – have a positive 
and significant effect on the likelihood of a return migrant becoming an entrepreneur.  
However, these two factors work differently for literate as opposed to illiterate migrants.   
For the 70 percent of return migrants in the Egyptian data set who are literate, the 
primary factor affecting the probability of becoming an entrepreneur is the amount of 
time spent working abroad.  By contrast, for the 30 percent of return migrants in the 
Egyptian data set who are illiterate, the total amount of money saved abroad is the most 
important factor.   According to the paper, illiterate Egyptian migrants may not learn 
many new skills working abroad, and this is the reason that savings accumulated abroad – 
rather than time spent abroad – is the critical factor affecting the likelihood of becoming 
an entrepreneur.  
  The third paper continues on the theme of remittances and entrepreneurship by 
examining how international remittances affect the level of capital invested in 6044 small 
enterprises in urban Mexico (Woodruff and Zenteno, 2004).  Most of the enterprises 
included in this 1998 survey are, in fact, micro-firms:  60 percent of them hire no 
employees and the median cost of invested capital in all firms is less than $1500.  Since it 
is important to separate the supply of wealth/credit from the demand for investment 
capital, the paper identifies an instrumental variable  -- the historic rate of Mexico-to-US 
migration – which is correlated with access to wealth but not with demand for credit.  
Using this instrumental variable, and controlling for various factors, the paper finds that 
international remittances (principally from the United States) are responsible for more 
than 25 percent of all capital invested in small and micro-enterprises in Mexico.  Within 
those regions of Mexico with the highest rates of migration to the United States, the paper 
estimates that remittances are responsible for 40 percent of all capital invested in these   15
enterprises.  Like the work in the Philippines, the paper finds that access to international 
remittance income helps to overcome the wealth and credit constraints that tend to restrict 
small and micro-business activity in the developing world.        
The fourth paper uses a 1997 household survey of 14,286 people (aged 6-24) to 
examine the impact of international remittances on school retention rates in El Salvador 
(Edwards and Ureta, 2003).  International remittances represent a key source of 
household income in El Salvador:  in 1997 about 15 percent of all households received 
international remittances.  While standard economic theory suggests that the source of 
income should not affect how money is spent, the paper analyzes how two different types 
of income – income from other sources and remittance income – affect the household 
choice of schooling levels for children.  The results suggest that the source of income 
does matter for investment in schooling:  income from remittances has a much larger 
impact on school retention rates than income from other sources.  In urban areas in El 
Salvador, international remittances have 10 times the size of the effect of other income on 
the hazard of dropping out of school.  For example, in urban areas the average level of 
remittances lowers the hazard that a child will drop out of elementary school (grades 1-6) 
by 54 percent.  In rural areas in El Salvador, international remittances have a smaller 
effect on school retention rates, but still the average level of remittances in rural areas 
lowers the hazard rate that a child will drop out of elementary school by 14 percent.  
According to the paper, one possible reason why remittance income has a greater impact 
on school retention rates than income from other sources is that households may have a 
higher propensity to spend on education out of remittance earnings. 
  The fifth paper uses data from a 2000 survey of 7,276 households in urban and 
rural Guatemala to analyze how international remittances affects the marginal spending 
behavior of households on consumption and investment (Adams, 2005b).  The paper 
compares the marginal budget shares of remittance-receiving and non-remittance 
receiving households on six consumption and investment goods:  food, consumer goods, 
housing, education, health and other (household services, transport, legal).  Table 6 
presents the marginal budget shares on these goods.  Like the study in the Philippines, the 
table shows that households receiving international remittances actually spend less at the 
margin on food than do households with no remittances.  Instead, remittance-receiving   16
households in Guatemala spend more at the margin on investment goods, specifically, 
housing and education.  At the margin, Table 6 shows that households receiving 
international remittances spend 2 percent more on housing and 58 percent more on 
education than do households with no remittances.  When disaggregated by level of 
education, most of these increments to expenditure on education go into secondary school 
education.   At the margin, households receiving international remittances spend 142 
percent more on secondary education than do households with no remittances.  The paper 
observes that such increased expenditure on secondary school education by remittance-
receiving households can help raise the level of human capital in Guatemala, thereby 
boosting the rate of overall economic growth. 
 
5.  Summary and Areas for Future Work 
  This paper has used a new data set of 115 developing countries and the results of 
recent household-level studies from 6 developing countries to analyze the impact of 
official international remittances on the developing world.  Five key findings, and two 
areas for future work, emerge. 
  First, with respect to the question of which countries receive international 
remittances, the study shows that two geographical regions dominate:  Latin America and 
the Caribbean, and South Asia.  In 2003 these two regions of the developing world 
received over 65 percent of all official international remittances.  By contrast, in that year 
Sub-Saharan Africa received less than 5 percent of all official international remittances. 
  The second finding is closely linked to the first.  The econometric model 
developed in this paper shows that two variables – distance and level of country income 
(per capita GDP) – are the most significant economic factors explaining the receipt of 
official international remittances.  With all other things held constant, countries located 
closer to a major remittance-sending region -- United States, OECD- Europe, or the Arab 
Gulf – are more likely to receive more per capita remittances.  At the same time, middle-
income developing countries – those with annual per capita GDP between $736 and 
$2,935 -- receive more per capita international remittances, because their citizens possess 
both the incentive to go work abroad and the ability to afford the travel costs associated 
with international migration.  The combination of these two factors help to explain why   17
Latin American countries (located close to the United States) and South Asian countries 
(located close to the Arab Gulf) receive such a high level of international remittances. 
The third finding adds a certain twist to the preceding.  The results of the 
econometric model suggest that the level of poverty in a developing country has no 
particular effect on the amount of per capita international remittances received by a 
country.  With all other factors held constant, countries with more poverty – as measured 
by the international standard of $1.00/person/day – do not receive more international 
remittances.  One possible interpretation for this unexpected finding is that international 
migrants do not remit for altruistic purposes in order to help their poor relations at home.  
Another (more likely) interpretation is that counties with high levels of poverty – like 
those in Sub-Saharan Africa -- are not producing many international migrants (and 
thereby receiving international remittances) in the first place.  More empirical work is 
needed to determine which of these interpretations is correct. 
  Turning to the results of household-level research, the fourth finding of this paper 
adds an important caveat to the relationship between remittances and poverty.  For those 
countries which are fortunate enough to receive international remittances, remittances do 
tend to reduce the level and depth of poverty.  For instance, in Guatemala the receipt of 
international remittances reduces the level of poverty (measured by the poverty 
headcount index) by 1.6 percent and the depth of poverty (measured by the poverty gap 
index) by 12.6 percent.  In rural Mexico, simulation experiments suggest that a 10 
percent increase in international remittances will reduce the level of poverty by 0.77 
percent and the depth of poverty by 0.53 percent.   In both countries, international 
remittances tend to reduce poverty because households in the lower end of the income 
distribution are able to produce international migrants and to receive international 
remittances. 
  The fifth finding relates to how households receiving international remittances 
spend or invest their remittance earnings.  While previous work has suggested that 
international remittances tend to be consumed, rather than invested, the works reviewed 
in this paper show that households receiving remittances actually spend less on 
consumption – food – and more on investment – education and housing – than other 
types of households.  At the margin, households in Guatemala receiving international   18
remittances spend 15 percent less on food and 58 percent more on education than 
households with no remittances.  Households receiving international remittances also 
tend to invest more in entrepreneurial activities.  Controlling for other factors, households 
receiving increased remittance income in the Philippines as a result of favorable 
exchange rate shocks tend to invest more in transportation, communication and 
manufacturing enterprises.  Similarly, in urban Mexico international remittances provide 
for more than 25 percent of all capital invested in small and micro-enterprises.   
In both countries, households receiving more remittances are able to invest more in local 
entrepreneurial activities because they no longer faced the credit constraints that had 
previously hindered such investments.  
  The fact that households tend to invest their remittance earnings in education, 
housing and entrepreneurial activities points to a promising area of future research.  All 
of the studies reviewed in this paper have focused on the first-round effects of 
international remittances, and have neglected the second- and third-round effects of these 
transfers on development.  For example, an inflow of international remittances into a 
local economy may lead to a surge in expenditures in housing, which will, in turn, create 
new income and employment opportunities for nonmigrant households.  Increased 
demand for housing will create new employment opportunities in construction for the 
poor and unskilled, as well as new business opportunities for merchants selling bricks, 
wood and other materials.  To date, very few studies have tried to evaluate the impact of 
these second- and third-order effects of international remittances on wages and 
employment in the local community.  This would therefore be a very fruitful area for 
future study.   
      The final area for future work concerns the ever-pressing need for better data on 
international remittances.  International institutions – especially the International 
Monetary Fund – need to make greater efforts to count the amount of international 
remittance monies that are currently transmitted through private, unofficial channels.  It is 
likely that poor people, especially poor people from countries located near the major 
remittance-sending regions of the world, tend to remit more through informal, unofficial 
channels.  For this reason, a full and complete accounting of the impact of international 
remittances on poverty, investment and development needs more accurate data on the   19
large and currently unknown level of unofficial remittance transfers in the developing 
world.    20
Table 1. Regional distribution of official international remittances, 1998 and 2003 
(million US dollars) 
 
Region 1998  2003 
Annual percent 
change, 1998 to 
2003 
1,668.2 5,302.1  +23.1  East Asia and Pacific 
(8) (7)   
Europe and Central Asia  8,630.9  6,507.6  (-5.5) 
 (17)  (20)   
Latin America and Caribbean  13,929.3  31,615.3  +17.8 
 (21)  (22)   
Middle East and North Africa  9,424.4  11,075.9  +3.3 
 (7)  (5)   
South Asia  13,293.7  17,851.9  +6.1 
 (5)  (5)   
Sub-Saharan Africa  2,918.8  2,477.9  (-3.2) 
 (19)  (17)   
    Total  49,865.2 74,830.9  +8.5 
 (77)  (76)   
 
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are countries reporting receipt of official international remittances. 
             Official international remittances defined as “worker remittances” as listed in IMF Balance  
  of Payments Statistics Yearbook, and do not include “compensation of employees” or  
  “other current transfers.” 
 
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook (2004). 
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Table 2. Distribution of official international remittances by income group of 
country, 1998 and 2003 (million US dollars) 
 
Income group of country  1998  2003 
Annual percent 
change, 1998 to 
2003 
Low income  17,196.8  22,863.8  +5.8 
 (27)  (27)   
Lower middle income  18,711.4  31,785.3  +11.2 
 (32)  (30)   
Upper middle income  13,957.2  20,181.8  +7.6 
 (18)  (19)   
   Total  49,865.2 74,830.9  +8.5 
 (77)  (76)   
 
Notes: All countries divided into income groups according to 2002 GDP per capita (constant 1995 
US dollars), as calculated by World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004. The groups 
are: low income, $735 or less; lower middle income, $736 to $2,935; and upper middle 
income, $2,936 to $9,075. Numbers in parentheses are countries reporting receipt of official 
international remittances. 
 
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook (2004).  
World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004.   22
 
Table 3: OLS regression on the economic determinants of official international remittances 
Dependent variable=Per capita international remittances 
received by country in 2003 
Dependent variable = Pooled data, Per capita 
international remittances received by country in 1998 or 
2003 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Distance (miles) from developing country to 
remittance-sending region (US, OECD-Europe 













Economic variables        









































Human capital, demographic variables        


























Financial variables        
Country credit rating      -1.179 
(-1.01) 
   -0.735 
(-0.80) 
Regional variables (East Asia omitted)             
Europe, Central Asia      -1.067 
(-0.63) 
   -1.854 
(-1.62) 
Latin America, Caribbean      1.908 
(1.34) 
   1.352 
(1.39) 
Middle East, North Africa      1.262 
(0.67) 
   0.859 
(0.70) 
South Asia      1.288 
(0.98) 
   0.772 
(0.87) 
Sub-Saharan Africa      -0.041 
(-0.03) 
   -0.442 
(-0.40)   23













N 55  45  44  109  88  84 
Adj R
2  0.271 0.367 0.572 0.282 0.313 0.538 
F-Statistic 5.02  4.65 5.42 9.48 6.67 8.43 
 
Notes:   Estimates obtained using ordinary least squares. All variables expressed in logs; t-ratios shown in parenthesis. Number of observations reduced for certain equations because of missing 
values.  
 
  *  Significant at the 0.05 level   ** Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
Sources: Per capita GDP data from World Bank, World Development Indicators (2004); inequality and poverty data from World Bank, PovcalNet (2004); education data from Barro and Lee (2001); 
               population data from World Bank, Development Data Platform  (2005); and country credit ratings from Institutional Investor.  
   Table 4. Distribution of households in Guatemala receiving international 
remittances, ranked by decile group according to predicted per capita household 








International remittances as 
percent of total per capita 
household expenditure 
(including remittances) 
(decile) (1)  (2) 
 (percent)  (percent) 
Lowest 10  11.8  62.1 
Second 10  4.1  37.0 
Third 10  3.0  31.5 
Fourth 10  4.6  32.5 
Fifth 10  10.7  25.9 
Sixth 10  10.1  31.3 
Seventh 10  14.1  24.0 
Eighth 10  12.2  20.9 
Ninth 10  17.8  15.9 
Top 10  11.6  17.2 
 100.0   
 
Notes:  Households ranked into decile groups on the basis of predicted per capita household 
expenditure (excluding remittances). Column (2) shows the percent of total per capita 
household expenditure (including remittances) coming from international remittances. 
 
Source: Adams (2005a: Table 7). 
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With controls for region* 
urban and pre-crisis 
household and migrant 
characteristics 
 (1)  (2) 
Panel A. Household expenditure (household-level regressions) 
Total household expenditures     
Food expenditures  -0.01  -0.007 
 (0.036)  (0.034) 




Panel B. Household educational expenditures (household-level regressions) 
Education expenditures 








Panel C. Labor supply of children aged 10-17 (individual-level regressions) 
 Females  Males 




































As worker without 
pay in family-














Notes: Each cell of table presents coefficient estimate on exchange rate shock. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for household-level 
regressions is 1646; number of observations for individual-level regressions is 579 
(females) and 609 (males). 
  *  Significant at the 0.10 level 
**  Significant at the 0.05 level 
 ***  Significant at the 0.01 level 
Source: Yang (2005: Table 4).   26
Table 6. Marginal budget shares on expenditure for non-remittance and remittance-












(No remittances vs. 
international 
remittances) 
Food 0.386  0.330  (-14.77) 
Consumer goods, 
durables 
0.203 0.229  +12.81 
Housing 0.183  0.187  +2.18 
Education 0.031  0.049  +58.06 
Health 0.023  0.023  --- 
Other 0.173  0.177  +2.31 
    Total  1.000 1.000   
 
Notes:   In the dataset, 1063 households receive international remittances (from Guatemala) 
and results for these households are not reported here. Some figures do not sum to unity 
because of rounding. 
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1 Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the most important source of external funding for developing countries.   
 
In 2003 the developing world as a whole received about $130 billion in FDI, and about $75 billion in  
 
official international remittances. 
 
2 In this paper official international remittances are defined as “worker remittances,” as listed (code 2 391)  
 
in annual publications of the IMF,  Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook.  Official international  
 
remittances in this paper do not include other line items listed in the IMF Yearbook  -- items such as  
 
“compensation of employees” or “other current transfers” -- because it is not clear if these items are, in  
 
fact, “remittances.”    Also, official international remittances in this paper do not include the large – but  
 
unknown – amount of remittance monies that is transmitted through unofficial and informal channels. 
 
3 Several of the papers reviewed in sections (3) and (4) of this paper were written under the auspices of  
 
the Program on International Migration and Development at the World Bank.  This World Bank program  
 
analyzes:  (1) the development impact of remittances; (2) brain drain; (3) temporary migration; and (4)  
 
trade, FDI and migration. 
 
4 While the Philippines and the Russian Federation both produce large number of international migrants,  
 
IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook  show that the Philippines received only $202 and $236  
 
million in worker remittances in 1998 and 2003, respectively, and that the Russian Federation received zero  
 
in 1998 and $300 million in 2003.    
 
5 In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, most of these international remittances came from  
 
workers working in the United States; for South Asia, most international remittances came from workers  
 
working in the Persian Gulf. 
 
6In the data set, 28 of the 44 countries in the low income group are located in Sub-Saharan Africa.    
 
7See, for example, Borjas (1987:  545-547). 
 
8To avoid possible correlation problems between variables, the poverty (and inequality) variables are  
 
measured using data from household budget surveys, while the per capita GDP variables are measured  
 
using national accounts data. 
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9 Another financial variable that might have an impact on remittances is exchange rate premium, that is, the  
 
difference between official and black market exchange rates.  It is possible that countries with larger  
 
exchange rate premium will receive less in remittances through official channels, and more remittances  
 
through (unrecorded) unofficial channels.  However, there are no data available for exchange rate  
 
premium for the year 2003.   
 
10 The poverty headcount index measures the percent of the population living beneath the poverty line  
 
which, in this case, is set at the international standard of $1.00 per person per day in 1993 purchasing  
 
power parity (PPP) exchange rates.  The PPP exchange rates are used so that $1.00 is worth roughly the  
 
same in all countries.  PPP values are calculated by pricing a representative bundle of goods in each  
 
country and comparing the local cost of that bundle with the U.S. dollar cost of the same bundle.  
 
11For work on the relationship between distance and international migration, see Karemera, Oguledo and  
 
Davis (2000); Vogler and Rotte (2000); and Hatton and Williamson (2003). 
 
12 This national poverty line was estimated by the Mexican Government (SEDESOL), and includes the cost  
 
of basic expenditures for food, health, education, clothing, shelter, utilities and transportation.  For more  
 
details, see Taylor, Mora and Adams (2005). 
 
13 Since the use of econometric techniques to predict the incomes of households with and without  
 
remittances is problematic in the presence of selection bias, the Guatemala paper uses a Heckman-type  
 
selection procedure to test for selection bias.  The paper finds that the extent of selection bias in this  
 




14 In rural Pakistan Adams (1998) found that international migrants had a high marginal propensity to  
 
invest in  two kinds of physical assets:  irrigated and rainfed land. 
 
15For a similar study on how international migration affects the employment patterns of return migrants in  
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